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Wages and Working Conditions of Truck Drivers 
at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles
by Kristen Monaco
Using	data	from	surveys	conducted	in	2004	and	2006,	we	examine	the	work	and	earnings	of	drayage	
drivers	at	 the	ports	of	Los	Angeles	and	Long	Beach.	 	Though	possessing	relatively	low	levels	of	
education	(most	have	a	high	school	diploma	or	less),	these	drivers	average	approximately	$35,000	
in	 earnings	 net	 of	 truck	 expenses,	 working	 on	 average	 11.2	 hours	 per	 day.	 	 Owner	 operators	
experience	increased	net	earnings	once	their	trucks	are	fully	paid	for,	leading	them	to	buy	older,	
more	 polluting	 trucks.	 	 This	 negative	 externality	 is	 currently	 being	 addressed	 by	 both	 ports	 by	
enacting	new	regulations	regarding	truck	drayage	in	Southern	California.
INTRODUCTION
Containerized traffic grew 196% at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles between 1995 and 
2007.  Accompanying this increased trade volume is increased pressure on terminals, port drayage 
companies and shippers to increase port throughput while also reducing pollution. One key 
component of this supply chain is the port drayage driver.  At the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach, which combined were the largest U.S. container port and the fifth largest container port in the 
world in 2007 (Journal	of	Commerce, July 28, 2008), the vast majority of these drivers are owner 
operators (drivers who own their own trucks) who were born outside of the United States.  The ports 
of Los Angeles and Long Beach teamed up to restructure truck drayage in 2007, and their Clean 
Trucks Program has been used as a resource in developing port drayage programs in other major 
ports, such as Oakland and New York/New Jersey.
While there is a substantial body of research on truck drivers nationally (for example, Hirsch 
and Macpherson 1997, Belzer 2000), there is very little known about the subgroup of drivers who 
work in port drayage.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that they possess low levels of education, are 
often first generation U.S. residents and typically earn less than drivers in other segments of trucking. 
The purpose of this study is to use data from two surveys of drivers at the ports of Long Beach and 
Los Angeles to describe this labor force, examining both earnings and work lives.
It is important to understand the nature of the work of these drivers.  Though most are owner 
operators, they do not typically operate with their own authority; rather, they contract with harbor 
drayage companies.  Given that these drayage companies rarely employ drivers, they appear to serve 
as brokers, linking drivers and loads.  Port drayage drivers are dispatched by the firms and proceed 
to the port and the terminal where the load is to be picked up.  The driver waits for his assigned load 
inside the terminal and is provided with an ocean container on a chassis (a frame with wheels and 
brakes upon which the container is placed to function as a trailer) that is typically owned or arranged 
by the ocean carrier.  The driver then leaves the port and delivers the load (typically to a destination 
within 80 miles).
The nature of this work leads to several questions.  How many hours do drivers work and 
how much are they paid?  How do the truck expenses of owner operators affect their net “labor” 
earnings? How much of the driver’s time is in non-driving activities (waiting at the terminals)? 
These questions are important given pending regulations at West Coast ports aimed at reducing the 
negative externalities involved in port drayage–namely the pollution generated by the older trucks 
that spend a fair portion of their time idling in terminals waiting to pick up loads. 
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These new regulations have spurred significant controversy, as well as pending lawsuits.  While 
the major California ports (the ports of Long Beach, Los Angeles and Oakland) all have designed 
programs that will require replacement or retrofitting of all trucks to meet 2007 EPA standards by 
the year 2012, the Port of Los Angeles has also added a requirement that all port truck drivers be 
employees of trucking companies.  Long Beach, adjacent to Los Angeles, has no such employment 
provision.  The Port of Oakland has not yet passed a final plan for port drayage, but its tentative plan 
calls for the use of employee drivers.
What is most striking in the following analysis is how much of the labor force in the ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach is comprised of owner operators (drivers who own their own trucks). 
This is in large part due to the changing operating climate of both ocean shipping and trucking in the 
latter half of the 20th century and will be addressed after a brief description of the data sets.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The data for this study come from two surveys of drivers at the ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles.  The first, a survey of drivers working at the Port of Long Beach, was conducted in April 
and May 2004 and the second survey, which looked at drivers at both Long Beach and Los Angeles 
ports, was conducted in December 2006.
While nationally representative data sets, such as the Current	Population	Survey,	Panel	Study	of	
Income	Dynamics	and	National	Longitudinal	Study	of	Youth, provide detailed data that is typically 
used in wage studies across occupations, these data sets do not contain information that would 
allow researchers to distinguish port drivers from long-haul drivers, or any other subgroup of this 
occupation.  There are some data sets that specifically collect data on truck drivers (for example, the 
Sloan Trucking Industry Program Driver Survey). However, these typically focus on long-haul and 
local drivers not involved in port drayage.
The sampling schemes differed across the two time periods, but both had two components. 
First, container terminals at which to survey drivers were chosen at random.  In 2004 three terminals 
at the Port of Long Beach were selected (only two were used due to logistical problems with the 
third; there are seven container terminals at the Port).  In 2006 four terminals were chosen (two at 
each port for a combined total of 15). 
The second component involved choosing the drivers to participate in the survey.  In 2004 
surveys were conducted before the gates opened, from 6–7 a m.  To ensure our safety once the lines 
of trucks began moving, the security people at the terminals requested that we leave the premises 
before the gates opened at 7 a.m.  The surveying was conducted during one week in April 2004 
and one week in May 2004.  The survey days included every weekday.  All drivers who were at the 
wheel of their truck or standing outside their truck were approached and asked to participate in the 
survey.  Drivers who were asleep in their bunk were not approached.  The survey instrument was 
a self-administered questionnaire.  Drivers were given a choice of taking the survey in English or 
Spanish.  
In 2006 the survey was administered differently, as extended gate hours were implemented 
that made it impossible to safely interview truck drivers queued outside of the terminals.  Surveys 
were conducted during lunch-time (11:30 a m.–1:30 p.m.) and dinner-time (4:30–6:30 p m.) on 
weekdays during a two-week span.  During this round of surveys, drivers were offered $10 each 
to participate.  The surveys again were self-administered and respondents were given a choice of 
English or Spanish versions of the survey.  The 2004 survey resulted in 175 observations, and the 
2006 survey resulted in 197 observations.
While we do not believe that we can consider the data representative of port drivers at the 
national level, the sampling scheme and participation rate resulted in data representative of drivers 
who haul containers to and from the terminals at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The 
descriptive statistics of the samples are very close to those of Husing et al. (2007), who used our 
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results as the baseline against which they assessed their own survey results for their economic 
analysis of the ports’ Clean Trucks Program. 
Table 1 presents demographics for the drivers for both 2004 and 2006 data sets (some variables 
were not present in both data sets). These demographics highlight the commonalities and differences 
between port drayage drivers and other types of drivers.  The drivers are overwhelmingly male and 
possess low levels of education, as seen in prior research using Current	Population	Survey data 
(Belman and Monaco 2001), as well as data on long-haul drivers (Belman, Monaco and Brooks 
2005).
Table 1: Driver Demographics
Variable 2004 2006
Employment Status Owner Operator 80.8% 78.5%
Tenure (in years) 3.44 NA
Experience (in years) 9.00 8.71
Age and gender Age 41.09 38.88 *
Male 98.9% NA
Marital Status Married 77.7% 78.8%
Separated, Divorced, Widowed 13.4% NA
Race/Ethnicity White 6.4% 2.1% *
Black 1.9% 5.2% *
Asian 2.6% 1.5%
Native American 1.9% 0.0% *
Hispanic 84.7% 91.2% *
Born in the U.S. 14.7% NA
U.S. Citizen 54.1% 56.5%
Education Less than High School 32.5% 48.7% *
High School Diploma 30.6% 33.2%
Some College 19.1% 11.9% *
Vocational or Technical Degree 12.1% 4.7% *
College Degree or Higher 3.2% 1.5% 
NA = not asked in the survey instrument
* = difference is statistically significant in a 10% test
The differences are visible in the data on race/ethnicity and employment status.  The drivers 
are overwhelmingly Hispanic—roughly 85% in 2004 and 91% in 2006. While California is home 
to a large concentration of Hispanics (47.3% in LA County and 35.9% in California versus 14.9% 
for the U.S.; U.S. Census), this level of concentration is unusual.  Many of these drivers were born 
outside of the U.S. (85.3% in the 2004 survey) and slightly over half are U.S. citizens.  There is no 
data on how many are working at the ports legally, but there is concern that the implementation of 
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential at the ports will result in a shock to the labor 
supply of roughly 15% (Husing et al. 2007).  
The demographics depict a labor force dominated by immigrants with relatively low levels of 
education. While there is no metric on the drivers’ English language skills, the surveys were self-
Wages and Working Conditions
26
administered and drivers could request English or Spanish versions. In both surveys approximately 
80% of drivers requested Spanish versions, which might be a proxy measurement of English skills 
and, thus, the ability of workers to get another job. These statistics do suggest that port drayage is a 
career chosen by immigrant workers with relatively low levels of education who may have limited 
alternative job possibilities.
DEREGULATION, CONTAINERIZATION, AND THE USE OF 
OWNER OPERATORS IN PORT DRAYAGE
Just as striking as the prevalence of immigrant labor in the market is the reliance on self-employed 
drivers (owner operators). This resulted from regulatory changes in motor carriage in the late 1970s, 
drayage firms’ relative lack of market power in the supply chain, and the changes in transportation 
resulting from containerization.
For ocean transportation the advent of containerization transformed the industry, moving a 
significant portion of freight from “break bulk” handled by gangs of longshore workers who were 
involved in considerable manual labor (illustrated in the film “On the Waterfront”) to containerized 
freight moved by longshoremen using capital-intensive techniques. The standardized nature of 
containers means that a container can be placed directly on a train or a truck chassis and moved 
from the port without handling the container’s contents. In concert with land scarcity and labor rules 
at the ports, this has resulted in the majority of goods handling activities relocating to the hinterlands 
from warehouses that were previously port adjacent.
Economic deregulation of interstate trucking, which began administratively in the 1970s and 
culminated in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, led to significant industry changes.  During regulation 
entry was blocked and rates were set through rate bureaus; after deregulation free entry led to 
considerable entry and exit in the industry, with exit by many large, incumbent truckload firms and 
entry of smaller, non-union firms.  Not surprisingly the erosion of above average rates of return in 
the competitive truckload segment of the industry resulted in wages falling considerably, as the 
union’s power was reduced.  While the International Brotherhood of Teamsters retreated to less 
competitive segments of trucking (such as package express and less-than-truckload operations), the 
union density declined in truckload service (Hirsch and Macpherson 1997).
The Teamsters are currently focused on a campaign to reorganize the port drayage drivers in 
Southern California, under the rationale that these jobs were under union contract before deregulation. 
They have been hampered in their efforts due to the inability of owner operators to legally engage 
in collective bargaining (Wyckoff and Maister 1975). With support from both the Teamsters and 
various community groups, there is considerable pressure to transform the port drayage jobs from 
owner operator to employee, which would make it easier to organize the drivers.
While the increase in containerization, deregulation of trucking and increased U.S.-Asia trade 
all help explain the increased demand for trucking labor, they do not explain the heavy reliance 
on independent contractor labor. The latter can be explained by the drive to reduce costs by port 
drayage companies, in large part due to the ultra-competitive nature of the market.
The dray portion of the movement of freight from overseas is a relatively small portion of the 
total transportation cost and an insignificant portion of the freight value (Leachman 2008). While 
this would seem to suggest that drayage firms could raise rates without major impact, there is a clear 
imbalance of power in the supply chain.  Shippers typically contract a “door to door” rate with ocean 
carriers that includes all transportation from origin to destination, including the dray.  The number of 
ocean carriers has decreased due to consolidation in the industry and the development of “alliances” 
among the remaining carriers. In the U.S. ocean carriers are exempt from antitrust provisions and 
regularly conduct talks regarding rates. In contrast with the limited number of terminal operators and 
ocean carriers, there are approximately 16,500 owner operators operating at the ports of Long Beach 
and Los Angeles who contract with one of roughly 600 drayage firms.  This extremely competitive 
market for drayage firms makes it logical to contract with owner operators to avoid the direct outlay 
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on capital, fuel and insurance, and instead pay a rate for the drivers based on a percent of revenue 
from the load.
The labor supply of owner operator port drivers for relatively low pay is likely the result of a 
few main factors: truck driving being an easy occupation to enter, few language skills are required 
and the truck investment will yield returns to the driver once the truck has been paid off.  In short, 
it is an entrepreneurial decision for these workers who would not otherwise have the opportunity 
to own their own business. Those who would classify these truck drivers as employees who pay 
for their own capital and operating expenses question the notion that the drivers are actually self-
employed, as few drivers operate under their own authority (Hamelin 1999).
WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF PORT DRAYAGE DRIVERS 
Hours of Port Drayage Drivers
Regardless of their segment of the trucking industry, truck drivers typically work more than 40 
hours per week.  Exempted from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, drivers’ 
hours are governed by federal Hours of Service Regulations (HOS), which limit drivers to 60 hours 
of work in seven days and 14 hours of driving and non-driving work time in a 24-hour period. 
Though the 34-hour restart provision of HOS regulations increases the number of potential hours 
per week above 60, this is not an issue for drayage drivers, as the ports have limited days and hours 
of operation.  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on days and hours worked.  Drivers were asked 
for total hours worked, which included driving and non-driving work time.  Non-driving work 
time would include as activities like waiting for a load in a terminal, waiting to be unloaded or 
completing paperwork.
Table 2: Owner Operator Hours Worked
2004 2006
Mean Median Mean Median
Days Per Week 5 5 5.3 5
Hours per day 11.5 11 11.2 11
Hours per week NA NA 57.18 60
The increase in the mean days worked from 2004 to 2006 is likely due to a change in operations 
at the Port terminals in 2005.  Terminals open earlier, close later and now offer limited gate hours on 
Saturdays.  This was part of a program, PierPASS, intended to relieve road congestion by moving 
traffic to off-peak hours and assessing a fee (now $50) on peak moves. Peak hours are defined as 
3 a m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays and off-peak as after 6 p m. on weekdays and anytime on Saturday.
An unintended consequence of this is that drivers were able to drive more hours. In the 2004 
survey, only 7% of drivers reported driving 14 hours or more and this increased to 10% in 2006 (this 
difference is not statistically significant).  In 2006 drivers were also asked about hours worked in 
the last week.  The mean was 57.2, and the median was 60 hours, as was the 75th percentile.  Twenty 
percent of drivers report driving more hours than the weekly legal limit.
Some of the violations of weekly hours limits appear to be attributable to the PierPASS program. 
The 2006 survey asked drivers specifically about whether they typically drove peak or off-peak and 
their opinions regarding PierPASS.  Drivers who report primarily driving off-peak (23.7% of the 
sample) reported a mean of 11.87 hours per day of driving and non-driving time, significantly higher 
than 11.3 hours per day averaged by the drivers who report primarily driving during peak hours. 
Though the difference in daily hours is statistically significant in a 10% test, the difference in hours 
per week is not statistically significant.
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Drivers were asked two questions specifically regarding PierPASS:
1.  Are you earning more income under extended gate hours?
2.  Are you working more hours under extended gate hours?
The majority of drivers reported not earning more income under the PierPASS program 
(53.61% versus 46.39%, a statistically significant difference in a 5% test), and a majority reported 
working more hours (62.03% versus 37.97%, also statistically significant at less than 5%). Table 
3 presents a matrix of the joint probabilities of the answers to these two questions. While it may 
seem counterintuitive that a program designed to improve traffic flow could actually increase the 
hours of work, there appear to be three factors at play. First, trucking firms were more interested 
in dispatching drivers during off-peak hours to avoid the peak fee, which shippers were loath to 
pay.  Second, drivers had an opportunity to drive more hours due to the terminals being open longer 
(which was not possible before Pier Pass). Third, PierPass actually resulted in more congestion 
inside the terminals since there was a reduced longshore staff working the extended hours (Hanson 
2009).
Table 3: Owner Operator Drivers’ Opinions on PierPASS
 More Work Not More Work
More Income 36.8% 11.4%
Not More Income 25.4% 26.5%
Earnings of Port Drayage Drivers
While hours of work are relatively easy to measure, it is more challenging to measure the pay of 
drivers with precision.  The bulk of port drayage drivers are paid by the trip, with the distance of the 
trip the major determinant of the pay rate.  There are four common destinations for drays: near-dock 
rail yards (a rail yard operated by Union Pacific located within the Port of Long Beach), downtown 
rail yards (located in downtown L.A., about 20 miles away), warehouses in Los Angeles or Orange 
counties (typically about a 20-30 mile drive), and warehouses and distribution centers in the “Inland 
Empire” (Riverside and San Bernardino counties, typically a 50-75 mile drive).
Rather than focusing on pay per hour or mile, we focused on annual earnings, which seemed 
sensible, as the sample is limited to full-time truck drivers. Descriptive statistics on gross revenue 
for owner operator drivers are presented in Table 4 (figures are in 2006 dollars).
Table 4: Annual Gross Earnings for Owner Operators (in 2006 dollars)
2004 2006
Mean $58,551 $79,806
25th percentile $38,325 $60,000
50th percentile $60,225 $75,000
75th percentile $71,175 $90,000
While these revenue data appear to indicate a substantial earnings increase, it is important to 
note that the expenses for drivers (especially fuel) increased over this period. To adjust for this, 
earnings are reported “net” of truck expenses and compared to the earnings of the employee drivers 
in the data sets.  These results are presented in Table 5 (in 2006 dollars).
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Table 5: Owner Operator Net and Employee Driver Earnings, 2006 dollars
2004 2006
OO Net Employees OO Net Employees
Mean $38,537 $44,179 $34,749 $44,432
25th percentile $18,615 $32,850 $16,673 $30,000
50th percentile $27,375 $43,800 $32,543 $45,000
75th percentile $43,800 $54,750 $45,417 $60,000
In 2004 drivers were asked for both their gross and net earnings, after subtracting all truck-
related expenses. The point might certainly be made that drivers may have a tendency to report their 
net earnings as they would report them on their income taxes, which would not capture the “true” 
net if drivers misreport expenses on their taxes.
In 2006 we asked drivers for specific expenses involved in their operations and used this 
information to calculate the net. This might also be problematic, since drivers might understate the 
“value” of repairs they do themselves or overlook the time they spent working on their business 
(such as doing paperwork). Nevertheless, the resulting nets appear consistent with one another, 
so they are likely the closest approximation one can get without a detailed analysis of all time and 
costs involved in an owner operator’s business operation. They are also consistent with the results 
of Husing et al. (2007).
Two facts are clear.  First, employee drivers earn more than owner operators for their labor. 
Second, while there are drivers who earn considerable amounts of money at the upper ends of the 
earnings distribution, a considerable amount of owner operators’ revenues are spent on operating 
expenses, effectively lowering the amount they earn for their labor, assuming the labor payments 
are the residual after truck expenses are paid.  These expenses were the focus of the 2006 survey. 
Table 6 presents the major truck expenses, as well as their means and medians for the “big ticket” 
expenses, excluding the truck itself.
Table 6: Owner Operator Truck-Related Expenses, 2006
Expense Type Median Mean
Diesel $450/week $500/week
Insurance $600/month $606/month
Maintenance $5000/year $7044/year
The expenses on maintenance vary considerably (as is evident from the difference between 
the mean and the median), while the expenditures on diesel and insurance have less variation. 
The payment on the truck itself varies considerably, mainly due to the fact that most of the owner 
operators surveyed had paid off their truck (62.5%). Among those still making payments on their 
trucks, the average monthly payment is $892.
Determinants of Net Earnings and Owner Operator Margins
Typically, an analysis of wages would involve the estimation of a human capital wage equation to 
isolate the determinants of the wage. Using the 2004 data, two models can be estimated, assuming 
a parsimonious model due to the small sample size. One model has the driver’s net annual income 
(income that has been adjusted for truck-related expenses) as the dependent variable, and the second 
model has the hourly wage (defined as net annual income divided by annual hours) as the dependent 
variable. Explanatory variables for both models include firm size, experience (years as a truck 
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driver), tenure (years with the current firm) and education. Controls are also included for race, 
ethnicity and whether the respondent was born in the U.S. 
The results from this model are presented in Appendix A and suggest that such a model does 
little to capture the major determinants of net earnings for these drivers. The adjusted R-square 
is 0.15 in the annual earnings model and 0.09 in the hourly earnings model, and few variables 
are statistically significant.  The coefficient on the born in the U.S. dummy is large (10,686) and 
significant (p=0.08) in the annual earnings estimation, which suggests that language skills may play 
a role in improving earnings among these drivers. 
Most notable is that there are no returns to tenure, experience or education, a result consistent 
with Belman and Monaco’s 2001 study of long-haul truckers. Much like over-the-road drivers, port 
drivers in the sample have relatively low levels of tenure, and there is little reason to believe that 
firms would reward drivers for firm attachment when labor is easily substituted, considering there 
are few firm-specific skills in port drayage.
If a human capital regression model does not yield significant information about the determinants 
of net earnings, what is the primary determinant?  Not surprisingly, it is the truck-related expenses 
a driver incurs. Using data from the 2006 survey, we calculate the ratio of net to gross income, 
presented in Figure 1.
The mean ratio of net to gross earnings across owner operators is 0.466 with a median of 0.487. 
If the sample is split by whether drivers have paid off their trucks, the ratio is 0.526 among those 
drivers who own their trucks and 0.397 among those who do not.  This difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This is expected, given that trucks are a major capital expense.  Since 
drivers must finance their own trucks, they do not purchase trucks from recent model years, as new 
diesel trucks cost $100,000 or more. Figure 2 presents the distribution of truck ages in the 2006 
sample, and Figure 3 presents the distribution of truck ages at purchase.
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Figure 1: Owner Operators’ Ratio of Net Earnings to Gross Earnings, 2006
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Figure 2: Distribution of Truck Model Year, 2006
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Most trucks are model years 1994-1998. The oldest model year in the sample was 1974 and the 
newest is 2006.  The mean is 1995.  The mean age of the truck at the time of purchase is seven years, 
with roughly a quarter of trucks purchased at nine or more years of age.
To understand the lifecycle of a “typical” diesel truck, it is important to note that large, national 
carriers typically replace one-third of their trucks every year (long haul trucks are driven in excess 
of 100,000 miles per year).  Thus, there are many three-year-old trucks on the used truck market, 
which may then be purchased by a smaller local or regional carrier, who keeps the truck for another 
3-4 years and then sells it.  By the time these trucks are purchased in the drayage market, they are 
“3rd generation” trucks. The use of older trucks generates substantial pollution problems.  According 
to the Port of Long Beach Air Emissions Inventory, trucks servicing the Port generate 24% of all 
port-related diesel particulate matter, 33.8% of all port-related NOx, and 56.9% of all port-related 
carbon monoxide (Port of Long Beach 2007).  As previously stated, the ports of Long Beach and 
Los Angeles are implementing new programs to replace older model trucks with trucks that meet 
2007 EPA standards (either new trucks or retrofitted older models).  It is important to note that the 
emissions problems are not simply due to the age of trucks, but the amount of time trucks spend 
idling at the terminals.  This latter problem will not be directly addressed by the environmental 
regulations, but the overall pollution level will be improved due to newer, less polluting trucks 
without necessarily making the system more efficient.
A MODEL OF WAITING TIME
A key issue facing drivers in port operations is the amount of time they spend waiting at port 
terminals.  Since the vast majority of the drivers are paid by the trip, their income is decreased as 
waiting time increases. The increased volume of trade coming into the LA-area ports has brought 
longer lines at terminals. In order to address health concerns related to truck idling, California 
Assembly Bill 2650 (passed in 2002 and enacted in 2003) imposed fines on terminal operators if 
trucks idle outside their gates for more than 30 minutes. Though this law brought attention to the 
problems of truck congestion at the ports, the fact that terminals are not fined if they maintained 
appointment systems or extended gate hours has led to general consensus that the law has had little 
effect on the amount of time trucks spend waiting at the ports.
Queues at terminals occur for a variety of reasons.  Unlike a taxi queuing model at an airport, 
the terminal cannot simply give the next available container that needs to be delivered to the driver 
as he arrives at the terminal.  Drivers need to be matched with their particular load.  Ideally terminal 
operators would know when a driver was arriving for a specific load, mount it on a chassis and have 
it waiting for the driver when he arrives.  As more container terminals stack containers to increase 
their capacity, they assign less land space to “staging areas.”  Thus, a driver might arrive to pick up 
a container and have to wait a significant period of time for the container to be located in the stacks 
and placed on a chassis.  
Determinants of waiting time should therefore include factors that increase the likelihood that the 
container is made available as quickly as possible.  Clearly, most of these are either immeasurable or 
would require detailed data from terminal operators that they are unlikely to provide.  Rather, factors 
in the employment relationship or characteristics of drivers that might affect this likelihood can be 
identified.  Drayage companies who employ drivers (rather than contract with owner operators) 
have greater incentive to use their capital efficiently and therefore dispatch employee drivers to 
more efficient terminals or for loads that they know are ready to be picked up.
Larger drayage firms might also have an advantage either through better coordination with 
terminals, only calling at the most efficient terminals, or by the flexibility to reassign drivers to 
different loads if a particular container is not ready to be picked up.
More experienced drivers may have “institutional” knowledge that allows them to reduce their 
waiting time, knowledge perhaps manifested by contracting with drayage companies known to be 
efficient, refusing loads from less efficient terminals, or developing relationships with the workers 
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at particular terminals.  Finally, it may be the case that drivers who lack language skills are more 
likely to be delayed at the terminals.  Evidence from the wage estimation shows that drivers born in 
the U.S. tend to earn more (net of trucking expenses).  This may simply be the result of increased 
productivity (less time spent waiting).
On average port drivers in the 2004 survey report 48% of their trip time is spent waiting to get 
in and out of the port.  Among owner operators the mean is 50.2%, significantly higher than the 
40.7% ratio of employee drivers (significant at the 1% level).  The ratio of waiting time is modeled 
as a function of tenure, experience, whether or not the driver is an owner operator and whether the 
driver was born in the U.S.  The results are presented in Table 7.  As expected from the descriptive 
statistics, the sign on the owner operator dummy variable is positive and significant.   Owner 
operators experience more waiting time than employee drivers, all else being equal, which supports 
the hypothesis that firms that employ drivers will use employee drivers’ time more efficiently, since 
the firms directly bear the cost of inefficient use of employee drivers.  As firms do not directly 
experience additional costs from owner operators having longer waiting times, they are more likely 
to contract with owner operators for loads that involve longer periods of waiting time.
Table 7: Waiting Time Estimation
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Owner Operator 0.0792 ** 2.08
Experience -0.0057 ** -2.28
Tenure -0.0019 -0.38
Firm size 25-99 -0.0527 -1.36
Firm size 100-249 -0.0109 -0.18
Firm size 250 plus -0.1575 *** -2.77
Born in U.S. -0.1243 *** -2.72
Constant 0.5500 11.70
n 144
Adjusted R-squared 0.16
* significant at 10%  level
** significant at 5%  level
*** significant at 1%  level
There is a negative relationship between experience and waiting time, providing support 
for the hypothesis that drivers who have been in the occupation longer find ways to circumvent 
inefficiencies.  Drivers at the largest firms (250 or more drivers) have less waiting time, supporting 
the hypothesis that these firms may use labor more efficiently. Finally, there is evidence that those 
born in the U.S. have less waiting time that those born outside of the U.S. This suggests that the 
lower wages earned by those born outside of the U.S. may be somewhat attributable to language 
skills.
CONCLUSION
Port drayage drivers at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are critical to goods movement 
within Southern California and provide a key link to trade between the region and the rest of the 
country.  Using two data sets, this paper describes the earnings and work of these drivers, most of 
whom are owner-operators and many who are not native to the United States.
These self-employed drivers bear the risk of fluctuations in diesel prices, insurance costs and 
capital expenditure, allowing drayage companies to operate with significantly lower fixed costs.  The 
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drivers work long hours (on average 11.2 hours per day) and spend nearly half of their time involved 
in non-driving work (such as waiting at the ports).  Owner operator drayage net earnings in 2006 
averaged approximately $35,000, substantially lower than the $44,432 average of employee dray 
drivers. A model of net annual earnings for port drivers finds no returns on education, experience or 
tenure.  The key determinant of net pay appears to be truck-related expenses.  Those who have fully 
paid for their trucks earn substantially more than both owner operators still making truck payments 
and employee dray drivers.  This gives an incentive for drivers to buy older, less expensive trucks 
(most trucks are model years 1994-1998) that generate a great deal of pollution.
While new regulations planned at the major California ports will phase out the oldest trucks, 
only the Port of Los Angeles has finalized plans to require that all drivers have employee rather 
than owner operator status.  In theory, this should lead to more efficient truck operations within 
the terminals, where we find that owner operators, those from smaller firms and those born outside 
the U.S. have significantly longer waiting times than employee drivers, drivers from the largest 
companies and drivers born in the U.S.  Though the American Trucking Association has a lawsuit 
pending that challenges the employee driver requirement, the mayors of Oakland, New York and 
Newark have supported programs that would both strengthen environmental regulations and support 
plans to unionize drivers at the ports (White 2009).
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Endnotes
1. While it is customary to ask respondents separately about race and ethnicity (as does the CPS), 
this caused some confusion among the respondents in 2004, so in 2006 we asked about race and 
ethnicity in the same question. The 2004 responses have been adjusted to reflect this, thus all 
respondents reporting “White” are non-Hispanic Whites (and the same holds for the other racial 
categories).
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APPENDIX A: Wage Estimation
Annual Earning Estimation Hourly Earnings Estimation
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Experience (in years) 41.438 0.15 -0.008 -0.08
Tenure (in months) 475.283 0.78 0.077 0.33
Some College -997.636 -0.23 -0.150 -0.10
Vocational/ Associate’s Degree -2855.599 -0.53 -1.142 -0.56
College -6946.763 -0.58 -2.656 -0.59
Firm size 25-99 -2334.811 -0.56 -1.079 -0.67
Firm size 100-249 -9991.611* -1.70 -4.053* -1.78
Firm size 250 plus 6349.509 0.75 4.361 1.30
Black -12314.75 -0.84 -0.342 -0.06
Asian -2036.832 -0.13 2.988 0.53
Hispanic -5872.765 -0.80 2.059 0.73
Born in the U.S. 10685.61* 1.79 3.526 1.59
Constant 41928.87 3.91 10.454 3.02
n 123 123
R-squared 0.15 0.09
*significant at 10% level
